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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE WTO: 
A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE 
D.M. NACHANE* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) 
The concept of intellectual property is far from being a recent one. Even in the 
times of the Middle Ages, merchants were often granted exclusive rights to 
inventions via «letters of patent». In fact, the modern patent system may be 
traced directly back to a statute passed in Venice in 1474. 
The most common forms of IPRs, currently in vogue, are the following: 
• patents; 
• copyrights; 
• trademarks; 
• trade secrets and 
• plant breeders rights (PBRs). 
Of the above instruments, patents and (to a lesser extent) PBRs have figured 
most prominently in the recent acrimonious TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights) debate. Our paper focuses almost exclusively on patents. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The first section examines certain 
features of IPRs. Section 2 delves into the motivations behind the move to 
global strengthening of IPRs, initiated by the US and other developed countries. 
Section 3 shows the LDCs ' perspective on IPRs. The legal aspects of the new 
IPR regime in the Indian context are explored in Section 4, whereas their likely 
economic impacts are discussed in Section 5. A post-mortem of the «opt-out» 
option is described in Section 6 with conclusions gathered in Section 7. 
1.2. PATENTS 
A patent is intended to protect a particular product or a process that is the out-
come of inventive thought. It allows the patentee to forbid commercial exploita-
tion of the product (or process) by others in the country of the patent issue, 
without an explicit licence from the patentee. However, in order to protect the 
diffusion of technological knowledge, two provisos are entered. First of all, the 
prohibition of exploitation (without a licence) is limited to a specific period. 
Secondly, if a patent is not used by its holder and a licence is not issued to 
another person, the patent holder can be compelled by law to issue a c o m p u l -
sory licence» (or in extreme cases the patent can be even forfeited). The condi-
Director, Department of Economics, University of Mumbai Vidyanagari, India. (Currently Hallsworth Fellow at the 
University of Manchester.) 
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tions for granting a compulsory licence are regulated by the national patent act 
of the country in question. 
Patent laws can thus vary among countries, in terms of three characteristics: 
• life of the patent; 
• conditions for granting compulsory licence or forfeiture; 
• the scope of the product or process that can be patented 1. 
On the other hand, there is a considerable degree of unanimity, among national 
patent systems, on the following four criteria of eligibility for granting a patent: 
• utility; 
• novelty; 
• non-obviousness; 
• sufficient disclosure (in patent applications). 
2. STRENGTHENING GLOBAL IPRs 
2.1. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY CHARACTERISTICS 
One of the primary reasons that the move towards a strictly global IPR regime 
is becoming more popular, in the developed world, is found in the fundamental 
changes of the character of technology, over the past two decades. 
• Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, as highlighted by Mytalka (1987), 
Kaplinsky (1989) and Thurow (1997), the knowledge intensity of production 
has increased and so has the «science-content» of knowledge. As knowledge 
intensity has grown, the individual inventor has been increasingly replaced 
by the corporate entity. Simultaneously, the increasing «scientisation» has 
taken on considerable scope for scale economies (very often by transcending 
national boundaries). Thus the battle for IPR has become a high-stake war, 
involving mega corporations and transnational enterprises, rather than scat-
tered individual scientists. This is particularly true of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology sectors. 
• The «electronics revolution» has not only accelerated the pace of diffusion 
in the electronics sector, but has also made imitation costless and difficult to 
prove. This is particularly true in the field of semi-conductors, where dupli-
cation via reverse-engineering can be relatively easy. Thus, technological 
leakage is common and hence, invested interests in industrialised countries 
have been quite active in lobbying for stronger protection 2. 
• Perhaps the most striking technological development of the past few decades 
has been biotechnology, whose vast potential is yet to be realised, but which 
poses several problematical issues in the IPRs context. Firstly, until very 
recently, with the notable exception of the US, most national patent systems 
1. The Indian Patents Act 1970, for example, recognises only process patents (i.e. not product patents) for food items, 
drugs, optical glass and semi-conductors. It also does not grant patents relating to certain items of atomic energy. 
The US Patents Laws, on the other hand, have virtually no exceptions on patentability, considering all «non-natu-
rally occurring non-human multi-cellular living organisms including animals as patentable subject matter». 
2. Largely as a result of such pressures, the US Copyright Law was amended in 1976 to extend copyright protection to 
computer programs, spreadsheets, films, music etc. and the US Semi-conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 was 
introduced in order to grant a ten-year protection to inventions in the field of semi-conductor topography. 
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have not provided patents for microorganisms. Considering that the peculiar 
feature of biotechnology is its considerable threshold of investment in 
resources, needed for identifying microorganisms, in the absence of ade-
quate IPR protection, it is very likely that such an investment may fall short 
of the social optimum. Secondly, as opposed to other sciences, the link 
between the scientific origin of an idea in biotechnology and its commercial 
exploitation is direct, while the time lag between invention and innovation is 
virtually negligible. The «disclosure requirement» of the traditional patent-
ing system may thus prove to be an inducement for illegal duplication in the 
absence of adequate safeguards. 
The preceeding discussion highlights an important fact. Substantial technological 
changes have occurred in the past few decades that necessitate a revision of the 
traditional approach to IPRs in the industrialised countries of the West (espe-
cially the US). These countries alone can allocate the huge resources necessary 
for scientific enterprises. It is then no wonder that a large part of the initiative to 
strengthen IPRs globally has come from the West, with the US in the vanguard. 
2.2. US IMPERATIVES 
While technological characteristics are the motivating source for strengthening 
IPRs, their emergence on the Uruguay Round agenda owes a great deal to US 
initiatives. The US goals in the Uruguay Round may be formally described as: 
• achieving a comprehensive and self-actuating Agreement on TRIPs to 
replace the mechanism of dispute resolution (in the area of IPRs) via ad-hoc 
country-specific approaches; 
• legitimising the linkage between IPR issues and the global trading system by 
making trade sanctions a legitimate method of retaliation against erring 
nations. 
There is no satisfactory analytical framework to explain US policy imperatives, 
although the UNCTAD (1990) report is an interesting attempt. The UNCTAD 
thesis is predicated on two major ingredients - the product cycle theory (Ver-
non, 1971) and the hegemonic-stability theory of international relations (Gilpin, 
1987). As is well known, the products cycle theory postulates that major prod-
ucts are innovated by TNCs and produced initially in advanced countries. In the 
later stages of a product's life, the competitive advantage of location shifts to 
LDCs. A TNC (transnational corporation) may still retain control of these later 
stages of production, provided that the production technology has not passed 
into the hands of LDC firms. If the technology is transferred onto LDC produc-
ers, then they may well appropriate the major benefits of the later stages of the 
product cycle, at the expense of the TNCs. TNC lobbies would therefore be 
impelled to pressure their governments for stricter IPR regimes, both at home 
and abroad. However, applying pressure on foreign governments to be fined can 
only be the prerogative of a global hegemon. 
The theory of hegemonic stability maintains that the global leadership and eco-
nomic enforcement functions are usually devolved to the hegemon if one exists. 
Logically, markets will be relatively open in the presence of a hegemon 
and relatively protectionist in its absence. This hypothesis seems to be well 
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illustrated by the experience of Britain in the 19th century and by the US in the 
early post-World War II phase. However, the hegemon that seeks to establish 
open markets for goods will also attempt to establish closed markets for intel-
lectual property. Furthermore, concern with free trade of goods is likely to be 
paramount when the hegemon is in a strongly competitive position (or when 
most of its industries are in the early stage of the product cycle). On the other 
hand, IPRs become the dominant preoccupation when the hegemon looses its 
competitive edge, with the bulk of its industries in the advanced maturing stages 
of the product cycle. The UNCTAD report thus attributes the hardening of the 
US stance on IPRs, in the 1980s, to its declining competitive position (or what 
Bhagwati and Patrick [1990] call the «diminishing giant syndrome»). Interest-
ingly enough, the theory also attempts to explain why trade retaliation emerges 
as the favoured instrument for seeking stricter IPR enforcement. The diminish-
ing competitive edge of the hegemon means that foreign imports claim a large 
share in their own market, so that, in a sense, the economic weakness of the 
hegemon becomes precisely its political leverage. 
The UNCTAD theory has several weaknesses but we shall not discuss them 
here, since they have already been discussed by the author in an earlier paper 
(Nachane 1995). However, the major contribution of the UNCTAD theory is 
that it highlights the critical fact that a nation's attitudes to IPRs evolve over 
time and that they are conditioned by its internal economic and political situa-
tion. More precisely, the statute of a national IPR regime will be the outcome of 
conflicting interests between innovators and imitators, as well as among other 
groups (especially consumers) in society, as resolved through the political 
process. As innovation proceeds apace, the interests of innovators dominate 
those of imitators so that a hegemon, in its early phases of domination, might 
even favour weak IPR regimes 1 . Nonetheless, in the later stages, as imitators 
overshadow innovators, the same nation may become an advocate of a strong 
IPR regime. 
2.3. US POLICY INITIATIVES 
The discussion above should have made it reasonably clear that the US (and 
other developed countries) have a strong incentive to push for stricter intellec-
tual property protection. US trade legislation, over recent years, increasingly 
reflects this preoccupation. Intellectual property rights were explicitly included 
in US trade legislation, for the first time, in Section 301 of the US Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984, which represented a considerable hardening of the US's 
trade policy stance overall. The US omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 (especially Sections 301, 310) took trade retaliation even further. The 
authority of trade retaliation, previously vested in the President, was shifted to 
the USTR (United States Trade Representative). A Super 301 provision 
enjoined on the USTR the responsibility for identifying and compiling invento-
ries of «unfair» practices in foreign countries. From these inventories, the 
USTR was supposed to select «priority countries and practices», set deadlines 
for expurgating these practices and impose trade restrictions on countries that 
3. We may cite the US non-participation in international copyright arrangements for the first 100 years of the systems 
existence as a case in point. 
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refuse to be fined. Furthermore, a new special 301 provision was introduced for 
identifying countries with weak IPR regimes 4 . 
Unilateralism however has its limitations, the chief among them being the fol-
lowing: 
• maintaining up-to-date inventories of «malpractices» has its costs and effec-
tive action is inevitably slow 5; 
• retaliation threats are ineffective against countries with limited presence in 
US markets; 
• trade embargoes entail a great deal of surveillance; 
• unilateralism tarnishes the US political image in the targeted countries. 
However, all of the above problems would be avoided if a multilateral body 
(like the then existing GATT) could be persuaded to put IPRs on its agenda. 
This was precisely the strategy adopted by the US (and the developed world) as 
soon as the Uruguay Round was initiated in 1986. The conclusions of the 
Round have been an exemplary victory from the US viewpoint, especially on 
IPRs. The TRIPs Agreement of the WTO, comprising 73 Articles, covers all 
forms of IPRs including copyrights, neighbouring rights (i.e. rights of perform-
ers, broadcasters and phonogram producers), integrated circuits, designs and 
patents. The agreement (see Hoekman and Kostecki 1995) seeks to: 
• establish minimum levels of protection for most forms of IPRs; 
• prescribe redressal procedures in TRIPs-based conflicts; 
• strive for enforcement of IPR standards in members countries; 
• extend basic GATT principles of national treatment, transparency and MFN 
(most favoured nation) clause, to IPRs. 
Many countries of the Third World have insisted that US unilateralism is now 
superfluous, because of the new TRIPs Agreement, and that Section 301 should 
be expunged. Unilateralism is, however, far from being dormant, although the 
US government has promised to persuade the Congress to take a new look at 
Special 301 and Super 301. If past experience with the GATT is any indication, 
the stalemate is likely to continue indefinitely into the future - only the severity 
of the «arm twisting» may be somewhat abated 6. 
3. THE LDC VIEWPOINT 
3.1. PARADIGMS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN LDCS: 7. DEPENDENCY THEORY 
To appreciate the attitude of LDCs on IPRs, it is vital to study their perceptions 
of the role of technological progress in economic development, prevalent in 
these countries. The dominant paradigm in this regard, in the early 1970s, was 
the so-called «dependency school» that originated in Latin America, with heavy 
4. Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) have dubbed these measures as «aggressive unilateralism» both because the US unila-
terally determines what constitutes «unfairness» in the trade practices of other countries and because the other coun-
tries are expected to undertake unilateral liberalisation. 
5. Bayard and Elliot (1992) found that out of a total of 82 cases initiated over 1975-1992. only 41 resulted in some 
form of retaliation 
6. In a case involving automative spring assemblies in 1981, wherein Canada had challenged Section 337 of the US 
Trade Act, it was ruled by the GATT that this Section was compatible with Article XX (d) of GATT (Hudec |1993 | 
presents several such cases). 
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overtones of the Marxist theory of imperialism (Furtado 1964; Warren 1980; 
Fransman 1985). The dependency school posits that there is a secular tendency 
for LDCs to veer towards technological dependence on industrialised countries, 
due to a combination of factors, namely: 
• the income distribution in LDCs is overwhelmingly skewed in favour of the 
upper classes, which dominate the market for consumer goods; 
• the operation of the «demonstration effect» moulds the taste of the elite 
classes in LDCs to the kind of consumer goods that prevail in the advanced 
countries; 
• the local manufacture of goods for elitist consumption is usually accom-
plished through technology imports (in the form of inputs, machinery and 
know-how) from the industrialised countries; 
• the necessary foreign exchange resources for such imports are generated by 
primary product exports. 
Several corollaries follow from these basic tenets of the dependency school: 
• TNCs become the dominant suppliers of technology to LDCs; 
• technology terms supply creates conditions favourable to the emergence of 
monopolies in LDCs; 
• such monopolies exhibit no technological dynamism of their own; 
• technical innovation in developed countries is of the labour-saving, capitalis-
ing variety, that is antithetical to the factor endowment situation in LDCs 
(Stewart 1972); 
• IPRs are a powerful medium for perpetuating the technological monopoly of 
the TNCs and, by implication, the technological dependence of the LDCs on 
the developed world (Vaitsos 1972). 
The last proposition is particularly relevant to the theme of our paper and under-
lies the strong opposition to the stiffer IPR regime among the LDCs, expressed 
in a series of initiatives at the UN, beginning with the Brazilian resolution in 
1961 and followed by similar resolutions at Nairobi (1981) and Geneva (1982, 
1984). It is also worth noting that several developed country economists have 
also questioned the relevance of a strong IPR regime for LDCs 7 . 
The early 1970s were a halcyon period for the dependency theory. It held full 
sway over intellectual opinion in LDCs. Several cataclysmic developments of 
the last decade have, however, put the theory to severe strain. The collapse of 
the erstwhile Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe was 
widely heralded as symbolising «the end of history» (Fukuyama 1992) and the 
unchallenged triumph of Western liberalism. This resurgence of neo-liberalist 
thought had a profound impact on development theory. Other developments 
reinforced the tide against dependency-oriented thinking. On the one hand, 
suprastatal agencies, like the IMF and the World Bank, were trying to encourage 
structural adjustment in the debt-ridden countries of the South, based on «the 
logic of the market place». On the other hand, LDCs were increasingly fasci-
nated with the examples of the Asian Tigers and the «flying geese» formation, 
7. Thus, both Penrose (1951) and Greer (1973) have suggested that LDCs should be exempt from international patent 
agreements. More recently, Bifani (1990) has also taken a fairly sympathetic view of the IDC position, in the 
context of the Uruguay Round negotiations, he remarks that «it is somewhat ironical that liberalisation of internatio-
nal trade will be now pursued through the growing global monopolisation of one of the most important factors of 
production, that is knowledge, a process facilitated by the absence of internationally agreed antitrust rules». 
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led by Japan (Chew and Denemark 1996). Dependency theory was rapidly los-
ing adherents among the intellectuals and policy-markers in LDCs. Time and 
again, scholars of this tradition have tried to point out that the success of the 
Asian Tigers was attributable more to the state's strategic role in these 
economies than to the unfettered working of the market. Moreover, the failures 
of «really existing socialism» in the East were nowhere equal to the failure of 
«really existing capitalism» in the South (Frank 1996). These arguments failed 
to make an impression for the simple reason that the failures of socialism were 
far more obvious, and one may add, spectacular than those of capitalism. 
3.2. PARADIGMS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN LDCS: 2. NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN THEORY 
Already by the mid-1970s, a new paradigm of development was on its way. 
Stewart (1977) provided a seminal contribution to the new thinking by talking 
about the advantages of being a «late-comer» in the development process. She 
attributed the success of several Asian countries, including the Tigers, to their 
concentration on incremental technical progress rather than their focus on major 
technology breakthroughs; or, in her words, they embarked on «technology fol-
lowing» strategies rather than «catching up» strategies. The new theory that 
emerged may be appropriately termed neo-Schumpeterian since, like the origi-
nal Schumpeter (1934) model, it focuses on technological change; however, 
there is a fundamental difference: whereas Schumpeter was concerned with 
path-breaking technological successes, the new theory focused on marginal (i.e. 
incremental) technological change. The neo-Schumpeterian theory (Freeman et 
al. 1982; Katz 1984; Teitel 1984; Fransman 1985; etc.) focuses on the advan-
tages accruing to «technology followers», that is: reduced costs of knowledge 
acquisition and risk bearing. Imitation is particularly attractive to LDCs since it 
can be based on relatively shallow levels of knowledge and has very little 
chance of failure, in contrast to pioneering research that may require in-depth 
knowledge, based on huge R&D investment, and where risks of failure are high. 
The implications of the neo-Schumpeterian view for IPRs have not been exam-
ined hitherto but they seem to be relatively straightforward. LDCs (like India, 
Sri Lanka and Brazil) that possess threshold scientific and technological capa-
bilities can successfully resort to a «technology following» strategy and an IPR 
system, conducive to such a strategy. An IPR system of the desired kind would 
thus recognise «minor» or «utility» patents, i.e. one where the «non-obvious-
ness» requirement, referred to in Section 1, would be considerably diluted. If 
«utility» patents were admitted in national IPR systems of LDCs, domestic 
innovators of such products could easily withstand potential foreign competition 
in this area. The grant of patents to foreigners for major technical changes will 
then be a matter of secondary importance to domestic innovators, who will 
occupy themselves with «inventing around the patent». It is important to note 
that the TRIPs Section of the WTO does not preclude «utility» patents. LDCs, 
in modifying their patent laws, would be well advised to bear in mind the poten-
tial advantages of such patents. 
The two major paradigms of technical change that we have reviewed have led to 
a vertical schism among LDC intellectuals. The dependency theory still appeals 
to the majority, who sees the WTO as yet another form of neo-imperialism. 
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There is also a more pragmatic minority of intellectuals and policymakers who 
view the WTO as a challenge, rather than as a threat, that is largely under the 
influence of neo-Schumpeterian thinking. 
4 . TRIPS - LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA 
Even prior to the coming into existence of the WTO, a certain amount of inter-
national cooperation in IPRs was already occurring, in order to obtain a minimal 
degree of harmony among country specific IPRs 8 . The main problem, however, 
with the several existing conventions, was their lack of authority in ensuring 
member-compliance and the absence of effective dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms. The major attractions of the WTO, for proponents of strengthened IPRs 
are twofold - firstly, its recognition of trade retaliation as a legitimate sanction 
against non-compliance and secondly, its implementation of an effective dispute 
settlement machinery. 
If one closely follows the extended discussions that occurred in the LDCs, in 
the wake of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, in academic as well as popu-
lar fora, one is likely to get the impression that the issues are innumerable as 
well as extremely complex. Additionally, it is the TRIPs Agreement that seems 
to be the major bone of contention. 
We have attempted here to group the various issues under three major headings 
and, more precisely, to discuss them in the Indian context 9. Thus, we address 
ourselves to the following three issues: 
• Does the TRIPs Agreement require fundamental departures from the existing 
intellectual property protection system in India? 
• Is the TRIPs Agreement an infringement to Indian national sovereignty? 
• And finally, what are the likely long-term economic consequences, for India, 
of this agreement? 
The first two issues are taken up for consideration in this section and the third 
issue forms the subject matter of the following section. 
4.1. TRIPS AND THE INDIAN PATENTS ACT (1970) 
The national legislation currently in force, in India, regarding patents, is the 
Indian Patents Act (1970). The TRIPs Agreement is based on the Paris Conven-
tion and includes three major additional features: the scope of patentability, the 
terms of the patent, and the «burden of proof» provision (for process patents). 
8. The major conventions were (i) Paris Convention (1883, revised 1967) mainly concerning patents, trade marks and 
industrial designs and administered by the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation); (ii) Berne Convention 
(1886, revised 1971) dealing with copyrights and also administered by the WIPO; (iii) Universal Copyright Conven-
tion (1952) administered by UNESCO; (iv) UPOV (1961, revised 1972, 1978 and 1991) also administered by WIPO 
and dealing with protection of IPRs in plant varieties; (v) IPIC (1989) covering integrated circuits under WIPO; (vi) 
Geneva Convention (1971) dealing with phonograms and administered jointly by ILO, UNESCO and WIPO; (vii) 
Rome Convention (1961) pertaining to «neighbouring rights» (performers, broadcasters, etc.) jointly administered 
by the ILO, UNESCO and WIPO. 
9. Far for me to claim that the Indian case is representative of most LDCs. However, many of the fears that have been 
expressed in the Indian context would, I believe, apply to several LDCs with differing emphasis. 
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Taking all features of the TRIPs Agreement and the Indian Patents Act (1970) 
into account, we may identify the following nine areas of potential conflict: 
• national treatment; 
• priority rights; 
• independence of patents; 
• importation; 
• compulsory licensing; 
• patent forfeiture; 
• scope of patents; 
• terms of protection; 
• burden of proof. 
We will, in turn, discuss each of these aspects. 
• National treatment 
Article 2 of the Paris Convention enjoins on signatory parties the obligation to 
provide nationals of other members the same protection of IPRs as awarded to 
their own nationals, as well as similar safeguards against infringements of their 
rights. Sections 133 and 134 of the Indian Patents Act (1970) explicitly recog-
nise the national treatment principle (Ponnuswami 1987). 
• Rights of Priority 
Article 4 of the Paris Convention accords rights of priority in the matter of 
patent application to any national of a member of the Convention. This priority 
is valid for a period of 12 months, from the date the first patent application was 
filed in any member country. Section 135 of the Indian Patents Act accords sim-
ilar rights. 
• Independence of Patents 
Article 4 bis of the Paris Convention stipulates that patents, requested in the 
various countries of the Union by nationals of member countries, shall be 
deemed independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other coun-
tries (whether or not they are members of the Convention). As pointed out by 
Sangal (1987), the independence of patents is not listed specifically in the 
Indian Patents Act but, at the same time, no provision of this Act contradicts 
this presumption. 
• Importation of Articles 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention explicitly states that «importation by the 
patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of articles, manu-
factured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the 
patent». In other words, imports are accepted as a legitimate means of working 
the patent. This issue is a very controversial one and has often been invoked in 
the past by those opposed to India's adherence to the Paris Convention. Section 
83 of the Indian Patents Act articulates the general consideration that patents are 
granted for being worked in India, whereas Section 90(d) maintains that «reasonable 
requirements of the public», with respect to the patent, are not satisfied 
«if the demand for the patented article in India is being met to a substantial 
AN
AL
YS
EN
 
UN
D 
ST
EL
LU
NG
NA
HM
EN
 
33 
extent by importation from abroad». It is important to note that importation per 
se is permitted under the Indian Patents Act and does not, in itself, constitute 
grounds for revocation of the patent. It is only when a substantial part of the 
demand is being met by importation that compulsory licensing or patent forfei-
ture is called into action. Therefore, the Indian Patents Act is not totally incom-
patible with the provision of the Paris Convention. 
• Compulsory Licensing 
The Paris Convention stipulates that a compulsory licence may not be applied 
for before a period of four years has expired from the date of filing the patent 
application, or before a period of three years has elapsed from the date of grant-
ing the patent, whichever period expires later. Such a compulsory licence shall 
be non-exclusive and non-transferable and can be refused if the patentee pro-
vides legitimate reasons for non-use or insufficient use. The difference with the 
Indian Patents Act, in this respect, is a minor one - the Act specifies that the 
period for which a compulsory licence cannot be issued is three years from the 
date of sealing the patent. 
• Patent Forfeiture 
The Paris Convention does not address the problem of forfeiture, except in 
cases where the alleged misuses of the patent cannot be remedied by compul-
sory licences. Proceedings for forfeiture cannot be instituted prior to the expiry 
of at least two years from the grant of the first compulsory licence. In the Indian 
context, the issue of forfeiture raises some legal issues of interpretation. Section 
89 of the Indian Patents Act, that deals with patent revocation for non-use, is 
completely in agreement with the provisions of the Paris Convention. However, 
Sections 64-66 of the Indian Patents Act make no reference to compulsory 
licensing as a precondition for forfeiture and may thus be found at variance with 
this provision of the Paris Convention. 
Thus, as far as the Paris Convention's provisions of the TRIPs are concerned, 
the differences with the Indian Patents Act are not significant and can be reme-
died without too much difficulty. However, wide discrepancies are evident 
when we consider the additional TRIPs provisions. 
• Scope of Patents 
The TRIPs Agreement has made the scope of patents virtually universal. The 
Indian Patents Act, by contrast, has several exceptions to patentability. Section 
4 of the Act excludes inventions related to certain aspects of atomic energy 
from the scope of patents and Section 5 grants process patents only (no product 
patents) in the case of inventions in the fields of medicine, food articles, drugs, 
optical glass, certain alloys, etc. 
• Terms of Protection 
The TRIPs Agreement lays down a minimum term of twenty years (from the 
filing date) for the patent's terms. On the contrary, the terms granted under Sec-
tion 53 of the Indian Patents Act are considerably shorter. More specifically, the 
term of a process patent in the areas of food, medicines or drugs is either seven 
years from the filing date of a patent application or five years from the date of 
34 
granting, whichever is shorter. For all other inventions, a uniform term of four-
teen years from the date of the patent filing is stipulated. 
• Burden of Proof 
As for the infringement of process patents, the TRIPs Agreement (Article 34) 
claims that «the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defen-
dant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the 
patented process». This has been widely construed by Indian analysts as being 
contrary to the spirit of the Indian legal system, which holds a person innocent 
until proven guilty. There are at least three qualifications to this interpretation. 
Firstly, the principle of «innocent until proven otherwise» was mainly applica-
ble to criminal procedures, whereas here we are talking of civil infringements. 
Secondly, the TRIPs Agreement also states that the burden of proof is on the 
alleged infringer only if at least one of the following conditions holds: «(i) the 
product obtained by the patented process is new and (ii) there is a substantial 
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of 
the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process 
actually used.» Finally, the legitimate interests of the defendant in protecting his 
business have to be taken into consideration - article 34, (2) and (3). 
Therefore, the major difficulties in modifying the Indian Patents Act stem from 
the additional provisions (apart from the Paris Convention) introduced into the 
TRIPs Agreement. 
4.2. OTHER FORMS OF IPRS 
Let us now briefly turn to other major forms of intellectual property and their 
position in India. 
Regarding copyrights, the TRIPs Agreement relies heavily on the Berne Con-
vention. As India is already a signatory to the Berne Convention, no major 
adjustment was necessary for copyright legislation in India to conform to the 
TRIPs norms. Nevertheless, the Indian Copyright Act was amended in 1994 to 
incorporate the following features: 
• Even though the TRIPs Agreement does not insist on Article 6 bis of the 
Berne Convention, Section 57 of the Indian Copyright Act, after modifica-
tion in 1994, allowed for substantial incorporation of this Article's provi-
sions. These provisions confer on the author, independently of his economic 
rights, the right to claim authorship of his work and to object to any distor-
tions or mutations of the same. These rights pass on to the author's legal rep-
resentatives after his death. 
• In accordance with Article 10 of the TRIPs Agreement, copyright protection 
was extended in 1994 to computer programs as well as to source codes. 
• The term of copyright (Section 22 of the Indian Copyright Act) extends to 
60 years after the author's death; this greatly exceeds the 50 years protection 
recommended by TRIPs. 
• The rights of broadcasting organisations and performers were considerably 
enhanced after the 1994 amendments (Sections 37 and 38). 
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The case of trademarks and designs presents very few problems. The TRIPs 
Agreement seldom conflicts with the Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 
of 1958. There was one minor point of disagreement on service brands. They 
could not be registered under Indian law, but the Trade Mark Bill (1993) 
enabled such brands to be registered by conforming to the TRIPs provision. 
Similarly, the term of protection for industrial designs, granted under the Indian 
Designs Act (1911), is five years whereas the corresponding TRIPs requirement 
is ten years, but this is a minor modification that can be taken care of without 
too much difficulty. 
For a comprehensive discussion of other forms of IPRs, one can refer to Debroy 
(1996). 
4.3. WTO AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
India's ratification of the WTO treaty was viewed by several commentators as 
being a «sell-out» and contradicting the provisions of the Indian Constitution. 
The arguments used by the proponents of this viewpoint were twofold. First of 
all, they argued that the Union Cabinet itself did not have the authority to sign 
the Treaty without the approval of the Parliament. Some even called for a refer-
endum, citing the examples of EU countries in the matter of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Secondly, since several aspects of the WTO dealt with subjects in the 
«States' List», the consent of at least a majority of the twenty-two states of the 
Indian Federation was a prerequisite to ratifying the Treaty. A noted environ-
mentalist, Dr Vandana Shiva, appealed to the Delhi High Court, demanding that 
the Government of India restrain from signing the WTO Treaty, notably Article 
27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement. The Delhi High Court, however, rejected the 
restraining injunction. 
Entry 14 of list 1 of the Seventh Schedule makes it quite clear that the Indian 
Constitution empowers the executive to ratify and sign international treaties and 
conventions, provided that neither restriction nor infringement of rights would 
result from such an act. In the event of any such restriction or infringement, the 
Parliament must sanction any necessary legislation. The Delhi High Court 
judgement, mentioned above, may be interpreted as a precedent, supporting the 
view that no basic rights had been infringed, when the Government of India 
signed the WTO Treaty. This also lays to rest all of the controversy surrounding 
this issue (see Debroy [1996] for more details). 
5. TRIPS AGREEMENT - ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
In discussions on the likely economic consequences of the new TRIPs regime 
on LDCs, two opposing views may be discerned. On the one hand, the tradi-
tional, dependency theory-inspired view postulates that strong IPRs will have 
deleterious consequences on LDCs. On the other hand, there is the nascent 
belief (a possibly influential view) that such an empowerment is an absolutely 
necessary precondition for LDCs to become integrated into the global economy 
and develop sustainably high economic growth. The quality of the debate has 
suffered from inadequate availability of sector-specific data. However, the 
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debate has brought to light certain key issues, while pointing out what institu-
tional changes would be necessary to mitigate the damages of a strong IPR 
regime in some sectors, or to maximise its benefits in others. 
5.1. TRADITIONAL VIEWPOINT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The basic theoretical argument for strong IPR protection is extremely simple. If 
returning to innovative activity (which is, in essence, a public good) can be bet-
ter appropriated, it would encourage innovation and hence productivity and eco-
nomic growth. This argument has sometimes been further simplified by identi-
fying patents as IPRs major safeguards, and by linking enhanced patent protec-
tion to improved manufacturing productivity and economic growth. 
The available empirical evidence in developed countries does not support the 
causal chains in the above analysis. The important surveys of US industries, 
undertaken by Mansfield et al. (1977) and Levin et al. (1987), rank patents 
fairly low, among various instruments, as a method of appropriating returns on 
intellectual property (except in the case of pharmaceuticals). Similarly, Watan-
abe's (1985) study of Japanese firms ranks patent protection below inter-firm 
competition, as an inducement to innovative activity. Historical studies of the 
Netherlands and Switzerland (such as those of Schiff [1971]), during their 
patent-free years, show no evidence that their economic prospects were being 
hampered by their weak IPR protection systems. Thus, in general, the link 
between IPRs and innovative activity, in industrialised countries, is tenuous 
(further details on this point may be found in Siebeck et al. (1990). 
Similar surveys on LDCs are not available; however, even if they were, it 
would be difficult to envisage that the above conclusions would be reversed. 
As a matter of fact, the link between domestic IPRs and domestic innovative 
activity, in a LDC, is much less direct that in an industrialised country; this can 
be explained by the fact that LDCs nationals hold a very small proportion of 
the total number of patents (the figure is in the range of 8-10% for India) drawn 
in that country. It was precisely this consideration that prompted Penrose 
(1951) to state: «These countries (LDCs) receive nothing for the price they pay 
for use of foreign inventions or for the monopoly they grant to foreign paten-
tees.» 
However, an indirect link could still exist between strong IPR regimes in LDCs 
and their economic growth if: (i) such IPR regimes lead to greater innovative 
activity abroad and (ii) the fruits of such innovative activity result in more rapid 
or cheaper transfer of technology from industrialised countries to LDCs. There 
is some evidence to support the first of these contentions in Lipsey et al. (1990). 
They claim that US firms that invest in production operations in LDCs are more 
R&D intensive than similar US firms that invest in developed countries. The 
second contention (about the transfer of technology) is far more controversial. 
In one of the first systematic expositions on this question, Vaitsos (1972) took 
an extremely pessimistic view: he regarded patents as a means of blocking, 
rather than promoting, technology transfers, because, in his view: «Patents give 
an exclusive monopoly position in a national market and by not being exploited, 
they function so as to block the transfer of technology related to the patented 
products. . . the closer a patent is to a final product the more it tends directly and 
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indirectly to block transfer of non-patented technology, since that product can be 
imported from abroad in secure monopoly-controlled markets.» 
Restrictive business practices, that foreign patent holders have undertaken in 
LDC markets, have also been documented. The more important of these are: 
• price fixing (i.e. prices charged by the licensee are fixed or controlled by the 
patentee); 
• discriminatory rates (discriminatory royalty rates charged to different 
licensees); 
• tie-in-arrangements (longer royalty rates, linked to purchases of other prod-
ucts from the licensor); 
• limitations on the resale of patented products in domestic or world markets. 
It is interesting to note that one of the avowed negotiating objectives of the 
LDCs in the Uruguay Round was to link the establishment of stronger IPR 
regimes with an easier transfer of technology, from the industrialised to the 
developing world. However, such a link is conspicuously absent in the final 
WTO Agreement. 
5.2. THE ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The theoretical case for stronger IPRs in LDCs comes from Mansfield (1988), 
Primo Braga (1989) and Sherwood (1989, 1990). Mansfield, for example, points 
out that «a reasonable amount of respect for IPRs» constitutes a threshold mass 
for initiating technological development in LDCs. Similarly, Sherwood (1990) 
draws attention to the role of IPRs in fostering «an inventive habit of mind in 
the population, in encouraging industry-university interactions and in the diffu-
sion of corporate business practices». Frischtak (1989) delineates the mecha-
nism by which a sound IPR regime induces firms to make stronger commit-
ments to R&D activities. Dollar (1986) and Guin Ru (1988) show that foreign 
investment inflows are positively correlated with the strength of IPR protection 
in the host country. On the other hand, Marjit (1994) demonstrates that global 
R&D investments may gravitate towards LDCs, as the latter strengthen their 
patent regimes. 
Empirical evidence to support some of the above contentions is not lacking. 
Ozawa (1985) cites the example of Japan, where a relatively strong IPR system 
increased the flow of technology and investment from the West. The World 
Development Report (1991) documents the successful technology transfer that 
has taken place in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. China is 
another striking example, where strengthening IPR protection and restructuring 
laws regarding foreign investment has resulted in sustained capital inflows over 
the past two decades (Paulwitz 1993). 
In the Indian context, beneficial perceptions of a strong IPR system are most 
evident in the works of Desai (1985, 1988) and others such as Pillai (1979), 
Katrak (1985), Deolalikar and Evenson (1990) and Subrahmanian (1993). 
Desai 's (1988) conclusions, based on data from Indian firms in the mid-1980s, 
should be repeated here. He came to the conclusion that multinationals are not 
the dominant technology suppliers of India and that technology imports did not 
lead to the creation of monopolies. Nevertheless, he is inclined to place the 
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blame for India's poor technology visibility on the Government's active protec-
tion of industrial inefficiency. Katrak's (1985) and Subrahmanian's (1993) stud-
ies, though operating on different time spans and data sets, find similar conclu-
sions, indicating strong complementarity between technology imports and 
domestic R&D. Deolalikar and Evenson (1990) succeed in establishing a posi-
tive correlation between grants of patents in US and inventive activity in India. 
This may also be viewed as supporting the complementarity hypothesis. 
However, this viewpoint has two basic limitations. The theoretical underpin-
nings have not been sufficiently clarified. Moreover, whatever relations have 
been made explicit are strongly grounded in neo-classical methodology, that 
may have severe limitations when applied to LDCs, especially in the dynamic 
context of technological change (Nelson and Winter 1982; Fransman 1985). 
From the empirical standpoint, many of the causal relationships identified 
would involve fairly long time-spans (e.g. the regression between R&D expen-
ditures and technology imports, studied by Subrahmanian [1993]). This would 
call for data that extend over a long period of time, which may rarely be avail-
able. 
5.3. THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INDIA - ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
• Pre-Reform Situation 
The traditional view of technology transfer, outlined in Section 5A, was highly 
relevant to the Indian situation of the 1960s. The picture, however, has changed 
considerably since the 1970s. It must be conceded that, from a long-term per-
spective, India's technology import policy has displayed a degree of flexibility 
that has had a significantly beneficial effect on the country's industrial techno-
logical capacity (Bell and Scott-Kemmis 1985). Certain additional features of 
the actual technology transfer process also deserve some attention (the discus-
sion pertains to the pre-reform period). 
• The common perception that Indian buyers of technology prefer to import 
cheap, low-cost technology is far from the truth. Indian firms, on the con-
trary, prefer to import the most advanced and up-to-date technology and 
whatever technology transfer has occurred has been at the buyers' initiative 
rather than at the initiative of the suppliers (Alam 1985). 
• An important aim of Indian technology policy, in the pre-reform period, was 
to discourage imports of packaged technology and turn-key plants. As a 
result, most of the technology had to be imported in an unpackaged form. 
• One of the many import constraints on the transfer of technology has been 
the ceilings on royalty and know-how payments (usually 5% of technology 
imports). These ceilings are well below the royalty rates that prevail else-
where (UNIDO 1977). 
• Altogether, the three factors above have meant that Indian firms have gone 
in for smaller technology packages. While the technology may often be of 
recent vintage, the range of products and processes encompassed by the col-
laboration are considerably less than what the supplier is willing to offer 
(Alam 1985). 
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• Another point worth highlighting is the duration of collaboration. An upper 
limit of five years, for such collaboration, was in force from the early 1960s 
to the late 1980s. The motivations behind the ceiling were to control the for-
eign exchange outflow, while simultaneously accelerating the efforts of 
Indian firms to absorb imported technology. The actual results have been the 
obverse of those expected. The Indian firms' access to technology has been 
severely curtailed (because of the suppliers' reluctance to transfer technol-
ogy, involving short streams of royalty flows, and because of the Indian 
firms' own inability to absorb complex technologies in a relatively short 
span of time). 
The problem with Indian R&D expenditure is not, as is usually imagined, its 
low level of 0.8% of the GDP (for the year 1995); it is higher than most middle 
income developing countries (excepting Korea). But its composition and lack of 
focus and direction are the main problems. Much of the R&D in the public sec-
tor is earmarked for customer services and expenditure on bureaucrats' travel, 
entertainment, etc. Besides, where government ministries are involved, funding 
of projects is often based on patronage rather than on genuine merit 1 0. 
• Post-Reform Scenario 
As an integral part of its liberalisation drive, the Indian government issued, in 
August 1991, a New Industrial Policy Statement, which modified several exist-
ing provisions. In 35 high-priority industries, it became possible for foreign 
equity participation, up to 5 1 % of total equity, to receive automatic approval. 
Foreign technical agreements, involving lump sum payments of up to $0.3 mil-
lion (RS 1 crore), royalties of 5% on domestic sales or 8% on exports, and up to 
ten years duration, could also receive such approval. Hiring foreign technicians 
and foreign testing of indigenous developed technologies was also freely per-
mitted. Repatriation of dividends was permitted, on the condition that dividend 
outflow was balanced with export earnings, over a seven-year period. 
One of the major issues of interest in this paper is how the new TRIPs regime 
will affect the development prospects of LDCs like India. The survey, by 
Siebeck et al. (1990), is quite exhaustive in this regard and we will therefore 
confine ourselves to only two issues that have not been raised in this survey. 
Firstly, the TRIPs regime, with its strengthened intellectual property protection, 
will almost certainly increase the willingness of technology suppliers to transfer 
new technology to LDCs, due to a reduced fear of illegal imitation. It would be 
generally agreed that a part of the lump sum payment, demanded by technology 
suppliers, is a kind of risk premium against technological leakage. With a strong 
IPR regime in place, the risk premium will go down and the increased competi-
tion among technology suppliers will also, in all likelihood, diminish royalties. 
Thus, it is quite likely that with a strong IPR regime, LDCs will have greater 
access to technology, at a cheaper rate. In the case of India, the loosening of 
constraints on technology imports, alluded to above, will strongly reinforce this 
tendency, as well as make new technology more readily available. 
10. See Bhargava (1995) for some incisive comments on biotechnology research in India. 
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The second issue we will discuss is that of the controversy over product vs 
process patents. Developed countries have long been arguing in favour of prod-
uct patents, especially in the food, chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors (where 
alternative processes can be used to produce the same product, the patenting of 
each one of these processes being cumbersome and difficult). LDCs, on the con-
trary, maintain that product patents discourage R&D efforts, since new 
processes can only be protected through dependent patents, conditional upon 
authorisation of the principal patent (Bifani 1990). Furthermore, product patents 
stimulate imports rather than domestic production of the concerned product". 
Industrialised countries express the fear that process patenting alone can lead to 
widespread counterfeiting. LDCs, on the other hand, are concerned that product 
patents, in the fields of food, fertilisers, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, etc., might 
raise prices in these sectors which are of vital importance to their developmental 
needs and can have adverse welfare effects on large sections of the vulnerable 
population. 
The TRIPs Agreement has given precedence to the advanced countries' view-
point. Product patenting has been made universally applicable and the period of 
protection has been extended substantially. This has raised a host of issues for 
LDCs, especially in the areas of pharmaceuticals and agriculture. However, as 
these are being discussed in separate articles, in this volume, we will not dwell 
upon them here. 
6. THE «0PT-0UT» OPTION - A POST MORTEM 
At the time when the Dunkel Draft was being actively debated in India, one per-
sistent strand of action, advocated by several commentators, was some form of 
«opt-out» option. In its extreme version, a total withdrawal from the GATT was 
envisaged, whereas in its moderate versions, the strategy advocated was to sign 
only selected provisions of any new agreements that would emerge (though 
whether such a select ive approach to international treaties was feasible, is 
doubtful, to say the least) 1 2. 
The signing of the WTO has laid to rest the controversy in India, but a post-
mortem is still desirable. It is very likely that some «opt-out» version will be 
brought up by LDC politicians and intellectuals, time and again, at the slightest 
ruffling of sensibilities on global issues. Since India's withdrawal from the 
WTO is extremely unlikely, we will concentrate on the more moderate version 
of the «opt-out» strategy, in which certain provisions of the WTO are violated, 
either by deliberate design or negligence (ignoring, for the time being, the feasi-
bility of such a course of action from the point of view of international law). 
11. Mansfield et al. (1977) have noted that process patents are a more effective vehicle of technology transfer than are 
product patents; the argument was further elaborated by Bifani (1990). Several other arguments have also been 
invoked in the product vs process debate (Kabiraj 1994). 
12. Speaking in the name of the extreme version, note Nanjundaswamy's following statement (8 May 1993, Mains-
tream); «I have been saying that just like what Russia did for a few decades - developing inside an iron curtain -
and the way China developed behind a bamboo curtain, I would like India to encircle itself with a khadi curtain.» 
Shukla (24 July 1993, Mainstream) adopts a more moderate position; «The fear of isolation is conveniently used by 
those who are willing to make significant concessions to the other side but are afraid of the political fallout at home. 
The protagonists of avoiding isolation at any cost rationalise their belief in terms of the absolute superiority of mul-
tilateralism to other modes of international relations in trade and economic masters. But neither the history nor the 
practice of multilateralism in GATT supports this belief.» 
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Of course, the consequences of reneging on a particular provision of the WTO 
can never be assessed, even approximately, since the nature of the trade retalia-
tion that will inevitably follow has not been spelled out anywhere in the WTO 
Agreement. It will, among other things, depend on which charter of the agree-
ment has been abrogated. Suppose, for the sake of specificity, that India is found 
to have reneged on its TRIPs commitments when these come up for review 
around the year 2000 1 3 . The US, in all probability, would invoke the Special 301 
provision. One would expect that the minimum level of retaliation could be the 
suspension of preferential treatment, on certain Indian export items, under the 
Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). The EU members would also, in all 
likelihood, execute a similar threat. About 15% of India's exports to the US and 
about 18% of its exports to the EU currently qualify for GSP treatment. It is 
doubtful that India could retain the existing markets for such exports, in case 
their GSP status would be revoked. The issue, however, deserves more careful 
examination. If the GSP status of imports from a number of LDCs were revoked 
simultaneously, the damage to individual LDCs would be considerably less. 
Thus, the extent of the loss to a specific country via suspension of GSP would 
depend on whether the country stood alone in its defiance or whether the action 
was being taken by several countries in unison. But trade retaliation could go 
much further, depending on the extent to which the country in question was vio-
lating an international charter. In the case of extreme violations, total trade 
embargo for limited periods cannot be ruled out. 
There is also a more moderate and constructive approach to the issue of global 
trade dominance by developed countries. This approach encourages LDCs to 
form regional trading arrangements, among themselves, with a view to consoli-
dating their countervailing power in world trade agreements. This strategy has 
considerable emotive appeal, representing in a way the economic counterpart of 
the «non-alignment movement». 
In spite of its many attractions, however, the economic basis of the South-South 
trade strategy is rather weak. The traditional model for explaining trade flows 
between countries has been the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 1 4, that assigns to each 
country a comparative advantage in the commodities using that country's abun-
dant factor intensively. Empirical evidence seems to be in consonance with the 
predictions of this theory, for North-South trade or, in general, for countries at 
dissimilar levels of development (Tharakan 1984). It is, however, a weak expla-
nation for trade between countries at comparable levels of development 
(whether of the North or the South). 
Trade between countries with similar levels of development is much better 
explained by Linder's (1961) hypothesis of intra-industry trade. This hypothesis 
attributes the observed findings on trade expansion consequent to the narrowing 
of income differences between the countries to the phenomenon of «demand 
overlap»; it increases bilateral trade in specific varieties of similar goods. How-
ever, this possibility emerges only when incomes have risen substantially and 
consumer tastes have acquired a high degree of sophistication. It is thus erro-
13. This is a very real possibility in view of the fact that at least two attempts to obtain a modified version of the Indian 
Patents Act (1970) passed in the Parliament have been unsuccessful. 
14. As Havrylyshyn (1985) has shown, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is also successful in explaining trade between LDCs 
which are at different levels of economic development. 
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neous to suppose that intra-industry trade could form the basis for South-South 
trading arrangements. Currently, South-South trade accounts for about 7 to 8% 
of global trade 1 5 , though this proportion will certainly increase as incomes rise 
in the South. Thus, whereas in the long run, South-South trade could offer some 
prospects, in the short and medium runs, the South will have to be heavily 
trade-dependent on the North. 
Thus, neither the «clause by clause» approach to WTO ratification nor a signifi-
cant re-orientation of South-South trade are economically viable options for 
LDCs. Their self-interest dictates participation in multilateral organisations, 
however unfair these may become. 
Some Indian commentators never tire of citing China's impressive economic 
performance in spite of being outside the GATT as conclusive evidence that iso-
lationism works. However, these glib defenders of the «iron» and the «bamboo» 
curtains forget the basic fact that even the severest autocratic regimes find it dif-
ficult to stop domestic consumers from being attracted to foreign goods. Fur-
thermore, several items of mass domestic consumption (e.g. textiles) rely on 
imported machinery for their manufacture. Some isolationists even point to the 
gains that can accrue through illegal imitation and counterfeiting, overlooking 
the fact that even such activities need a minimum of technical expertise, which 
may not be forthcoming in the total absence of global trade. But the argument is 
really going too far when one considers that China has been trying to gain 
admittance to the WTO 1 6 . A country would hardly be knocking at the WTO 
doors, if it were fully convinced of the benefits of remaining outdoors. We have 
hitherto considered only the trade-related aspects of the isolationist strategy, but 
if one also takes into account the fall out on foreign investment and aid, then an 
«opt-out» strategy could be seen as nothing short of economic «harakiri». 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has ranged over a wide spectrum of issues relating to IPRs in the 
context of LDCs (with special reference to India). The roots of the polarisation 
between North and South views may be traced back to the fundamental nature 
of the technological change that has occurred in the past few decades. It may 
also be linked to greater US intransigence on trade issues (since the 1980s), due 
to its diminished hegemonic position in global trade. The Indian case also illus-
trates the difficulties that many LDCs will face in transforming their weak IPR 
regimes, in order to conform to the stiffer regime dictated by the WTO. In spite 
of having adhered to the WTO, India has been able neither to modify the Indian 
Patents Act (1970) nor to install an effective sui generis system for protecting 
plant varieties. 
Thus, LDCs will typically find themselves powerless when enacting the neces-
sary legislation, in the face of opposition from social activists and environmen-
talists on the one hand, and sections of jingoistic political opinion on the other. 
The WTO, of course, will be far from sympathetic to the demonstrated impo-
15. Computed by the author from the IMF Directory of Trade Statistics (various issues). 
16. This issue figured prominently at the Sino-US summit held in October 1997. 
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tency of LDC governments in the matter of national legislation 1 7. Thus, most 
LDC governments are going to find themselves on the horns of a rather unpleas-
ant dilemma. 
When examining the economic consequences of the TRIPs Agreement, we have 
focused on the Indian case. However, the conclusions can be easily applied to 
the wider LDC context. Thus, the economic consequences will depend primar-
ily, not only on the precise IPR regime that will emerge, but also on several 
related factors, such as the official stance on foreign collaborations and invest-
ment, and on issues such as subsidies and local concessions for R&D in firms, 
universities, etc. A question that has rarely been asked, but which is a critical 
one in my opinion, is whether now that the developed countries have succeeded 
in having an IPR regime of their choice, sanctified by the WTO, they will com-
ply with the long-standing reciprocal LDC demand to make the transfer of tech-
nology more flexible and easy. No explicit provision to this effect is to be found 
in the WTO Agreement. 
The final part of our paper showed that backing out of the WTO, entirely or par-
tially, was hardly a worthwhile option for LDCs. The WTO is a Hobson's 
choice for the Third World. 
The character of the WTO as it has emerged probably reflects several phenom-
ena: the emergence of the US as a political hegemon (in view of the eclipse of 
the erstwhile USSR), precisely at the time when its economic hegemony is 
under challenge; the rise of trading blocs world-wide and the breakdown of 
LDC solidarity. In the era of international Darwinism, ushered in by the WTO, 
the sauve qui peut philosophy is going to increasingly pervade the trade policy 
of LDCs. There is the very real danger that the «scramble for markets», ushered 
in by this process, will aggravate regional conflicts in the Third World. This 
presents additional grounds for apprehension among LDCs. 
17. In Dec-ember 1996, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel found India to have failed its obligations under Articles 70.8 
and 70.9 of TRIPs. It noted that «we do not agree with India that the transitional arrangements of the TRIPs Agree-
ment necessarily relieve India of the obligation to make legislative changes in its patent regime during the first five 
years of operation of the agreement». 
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